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H
uman development is defined as
the process of widening choices
for people to do and to be what
they value in life. One of the pre-
requisites in attaining human development is
security which involves a situation that gives a
sense or feeling of freedom and safety to move
about or do certain things.
In the Philippines, one of the major factors that
affect security is the country’s overall peace
problem. With a long history of ideologically
motivated conflict that had resulted in armed
hostilities through the years between govern-
ment and certain groups, it behooves the gov-
ernment to look for solutions that will lead to
lasting peace.
Thus, for several years now, the Philippine
government has engaged in several series of
peace talks with rebel groups that include the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the
Communist Party of the Philippines–New
People’s Army (CPP-NPA), with the objective
of putting an end to the armed conflicts and
of attaining lasting peace in the country.
By their very nature, peace negotiations are a
delicate task and the process entails, at the very
least, a willingness on both parts to listen to
what each one has to say. It also calls for a
recognition and understanding of the factors
that give rise to the conflict.
This Notes attempts to identify the possible fac-
tors or determinants of the incidence of con-
flict. Making use of the results of the multisec-
toral consultations conducted in 1992 by the
National Unification Commission (NUC) cre-
ated during President Fidel V. Ramos’ time andPN 2006-01
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improving on an earlier study of some of the
poorest communities in the Philippines that this
author did, a model was developed to test
which factors are able to explain the incidence
of armed encounters/conflicts in the Philip-
pines for the period 1991 to 2004. Hopefully,
a knowledge of these factors may give an early
warning signal to the parties concerned and
provide the basis for government to work on
the appropriate measures to address them.
The spark that triggers:
a framework
The empirical test and analysis done in this
study is based on the theory of frustration-
aggression linkage where aggression is said to
arise from frustration. Of course, not all frus-
tration translates into aggression. But there is
one such kind of frustration that is most linked
to aggression. This is the feeling or perception
of being deprived relative to others that is felt
by a group of individuals who are bound by
some identity. If said relative deprivation is per-
ceived to have been due to government ac-
tion or inaction or to a systematic outcome of
present political processes, then that aggres-
sion becomes directed toward the government.
This kind of frustration also extends to the con-
cept of success. As the definition of human de-
velopment indicates, every individual aspires
to be able “to be” and “to do.” Achieving these
aspirations requires certain basic “functionings”
of an individual such as life expectancy, func-
tional literacy and standard of living. The pres-
ence of obstacles or barriers, however, that
inhibit the full realization of these functionings
of an individual, which are in turn perceived
by a group of individuals to have resulted from
government action or inaction, thereupon
leads to the group’s frustration.
It is thus important to identify these obstacles
or factors that are seen to inhibit the full real-
ization of such functionings so that an early
detection of a probable cause for an incidence
of conflict may be made. And proposed solu-
tions may immediately be put into place.
Laying the groundwork
for the analysis
The study would have wanted to capture the
processes by which frustration eventually leads
to aggression but limitations in the data and
other constraints prevented the author from
doing so. At most, then, what was observed in
the study was the initial situation that reflects
relative deprivation, some evidence of govern-
ment action (or inaction) and the resulting oc-
currence (or nonoccurrence) of conflict from
the period 1986 to 2004.
The dependent variable considered in the
analysis/model is the incidence of conflict. For
this, the data on the number of reported armed
incidents or encounters between the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the NPA,
MNLF and MILF from 1991 to 2004 were used.
Data on the history of conflict were limited,
meanwhile, to the incidents that were recorded
during the period 1986 to 1990. The term en-
counter or incident refers to actual armed con-
frontation and raids on various installations.
For the independent variables that would test
the hypothesis on which factors may explain
the incidence of conflict directed toward the
government, four sets of factors/evidences were
used, largely adopted from the list of causes
The empirical test and analysis done in this study is
based on the theory of frustration-aggression linkage
where aggression is said to arise from frustration. Of
course, not all frustration translates into aggression.
But there is one such kind of frustration that is most
linked to aggression. This is the feeling or perception
of being deprived relative to others that is felt by a
group of individuals who are bound by some identity.PN 2006-01 Policy Notes
3 identified from the NUC consultations in 1992.
These are:
 Factors that may lead to frustration





z History of conflict
z Minorization
 Factors that increase the cost of “learning
the truth”
z Poor or nonexistent roads
z No access to electricity and informa-
tion facility
z Low educational attainment
 Evidence(s) of government response/
nonresponse
z Poor governance, including lack of
basic social services
z Government programs on redistribu-
tion (CARP)
z Government policy on peace
 Factors that affect expected cost and ben-
efit of supporting the armed struggle
z Income level
z Demographic characteristics of the
family
Box 1 outlines in detail the definition and char-
acteristics of each of these factors.
The results: figuring out
which count and which do not
Among the general findings of the study/analy-
sis are:
Incidence of conflict by political
administration
In general, the period under study (1986-2004)
may be characterized by a wide disparity in
the incidence of conflict, especially if the fig-
ures are broken down by political administration.
The average number of encounter per prov-
ince during the Aquino administration, for in-
stance, was 0.86. This dramatically declined
to 0.04 during the Ramos administration, af-
fecting only nine out of the country’s 74 prov-
inces. The figure, unfortunately, shot up again
during Estrada’s time to 0.93 encounter per
province and increased further to 1.45 per
province during the present Macapagal-Arroyo
administration, affecting 64 out of the 74 prov-
inces.
Box 1. Defining and operationalizing the variables
1. Marginalized groups – defined as ethnolinguistic groups that
constitute less than 1.5 percent of the entire population based
on the 2000 Census of Population and Housing (CPH).
2. Income inequality – given by the Gini ratio. The ratio of the
incomes in the highest and lowest quintiles can also be used
as proxy.
3. Minorization – proxied by the proportion of “original” set-
tlers (identified  from history books and censuses dating
back to the 40s) in the region.
4. History of conflict – limited to the armed encounters that
took place from 1986 to 1990.
5. Data on educational attainment of all individuals of school-
ing age – taken from the 1990 CPH where the aggregation is
according to age group and ethnic classification of a munici-
pality.
6. Income – measured in terms of per capita expenditure,
thereby capturing permanent income.
7. Government policy on peace – represented as a catch-all vari-
able that stands for policy on peace and defense or on growth
and income redistribution.PN 2006-01
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Evidence of relative deprivation
In terms of the evidence of relative depriva-
tion, the differences in access to facilities and
services as well as differences in outcomes are
highlighted when municipalities within prov-
inces are classified into those with high or low
concentration of ethnic minorities. Obviously,
the “majority” municipalities (those with low
concentration of minorities) are the better off.
And while at first glance, the average differ-
ences between minimum and maximum val-
ues are not so stark, when probed deeper, one
finds that in the “minority” municipalities (those
with high concentration of ethnic minorities),
there are households with no access at all to
basic facilities like water.
Evidence of minorization
Relatedly, among provinces with mixed mu-
nicipalities (some have high concentration of
ethnic minorities while others have low), the
average proportion of original settlers has
dropped to 65 percent and for some, the fig-
ure can go down to as low as 1.5 percent. In
this sense, in-migrants have managed to out-
number the original settlers, resulting in the
process of minorization.
One of the glaring results of the study is that in
the mixed provinces, the issue of minorization
is the more relevant factor that affects inci-
dence of conflict, where the source of frustra-
tion goes beyond disenfranchisement of land
and is closer to political and cultural
marginalization.
In terms of the specific results from the model,
meanwhile, the following are to be noted:
The variables/factors that did not count
According to the model, the following vari-
ables did not figure as determinants in explain-
ing the average number of encounters ob-
served.
z Poverty incidence – the explanation may
be that poverty incidence is too aggregate a
figure and cannot capture the extent of depri-
vation relative to certain groups. Moreover, an
individual is usually aware only of his own sta-
tus in life but not of others.
z Income inequality – this may be looked at
as an abstract concept. What is more obvious
to the individual is the inequality in outcomes.
At the same time, if access to services were
equal, then clearly, inequality in incomes could
not have been due to government action or
inaction.
z Demographic characteristics – they do not
figure either as significant determinants.
The variables/factors that mattered
The following came out as significant deter-
minants of the incidence of conflict.
z Set of factors that may lead to frustration –
would include disparity in access to facilities,
in particular, to convenient water supply sys-
tems in provinces. History of conflict also in-
creases the expected number of encounters as
traumatic experience from the past, which is
blamed on the government, consequently
plants the seed of frustration.
Minorization, as noted earlier, is a very signifi-
cant determinant of conflict in mixed provinces
where the process has resulted in much frus-
tration among the original settlers.
z Set of factors that decrease the cost of
“learning the truth” – where the proportion of
One of the glaring results of the study is that in the
mixed provinces, the issue of minorization is the more
relevant factor that affects incidence of conflict, where
the source of frustration goes beyond disenfranchise-
ment of land and is closer to political and cultural
marginalization.PN 2006-01 Policy Notes
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(b) adults aged 65 years and above with more
education, is higher, then the incidence of con-
flict is lower because the act of verifying the
truth about the probable cause of frustration is
easier, more convenient  and less costly.
z Evidence of government response/
nonresponse – the government’s cumulative
accomplishment on the Comprehensive Agrar-
ian Reform Program (CARP)—and not just the
additional accomplishment of an administra-
tion at a particular time—is a significant deter-
minant of and a deterrent to the incidence of
conflict. Ditto with the government’s policy
on peace and income distribution.
z Set of factors that affect expected cost and
benefit of supporting the armed struggle –
while incidence of conflict increases with av-
erage permanent income (where average is
represented by the average income of the
middle quintile), at a high enough level of per-
manent income, though, the incidence of con-
flict decreases. This implies that incomes of the
middle class have to increase sufficiently high
in order to discourage would-be followers
from supporting the struggle’s cause. Again, the
classification of the province—mixed, major-
ity or minority—has a bearing on this.
What interventions can help –
and how?
Based on the above results/findings, what mea-
sures or interventions may then be adopted to
address or counter the incidence of conflict?
Using a sensitivity analysis test, the study looked
into six different interventions that the govern-
ment may adopt and assessed their likely im-
pact:
z Increasing adult education gives the best
results regardless of the type of province. This
will certainly help in decreasing the cost of
“learning the truth.” This, however, is easier
said than done since the data indicate that the
average educational attainment among adults
aged 65 years and over is only less than 1 year
of education. Obviously, then, the disparity in
educational attainment began several decades
ago because investment in education is long
term. The challenge in addressing this is there-
fore tremendous.
z Adopting policies regarding peace similar
to those during the Ramos administration has
a “radical” positive impact, especially among
majority and mixed provinces. In fact, the prob-
ability of bringing down the number of inci-
dents/encounters to zero is very high.
And while the peace and rehabilitation poli-
cies and programs of the Ramos administra-
tion may have had various external and past
events/developments working in their favor, the
fact that the period of peace was evident for
seven years during that time must certainly have
benefited directly from such policies.
z Removing the disparity in access to water
supply, in particular, the inconvenience of
sourcing water from outside the households’
premises, is an effective intervention especially
in minority provinces.
z Increasing access to electricity to 80 per-
cent of the households will bring the probabil-
ity of encounters down but not low enough.
z Finishing the CARP scope will not give the
desired radical results but this should not stop
Adopting policies regarding peace similar to those
during the Ramos administration has a “radical”
positive impact, especially among majority and mixed
provinces. In fact, the probability of bringing down
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the implementation of the CARP. This program,
after all, might be capturing the issue of settle-
ment of land disputes as a possible source of
frustration.
z Increasing road density will just yield mini-
mal reduction in the incidence of conflict be-
cause its impact is indirect.
Conclusion and recommendations
What can government do in the face of these
findings?
One, government policies on peace and in-
come redistribution are, by far, the most sig-
nificant determinant of incidence of conflict.
Those that address relative deprivation espe-
cially in terms of access to and provision of
safe water as well as settlement of land dis-
putes are very important. The same is true with
policies leading to economic growth. Govern-
ment must make sure that this will be adequate
as to increase incomes of the middle class.
Two, programs that improve adult education
should be actively pursued as they are worth-
while investments in achieving peace in the
future.
Three, in the short run, interventions that en-
courage truth-learning behavior and reduce
the cost of learning the truth must be pursued.
Efforts to bring government closer to the mi-
nority groups through the provision, for in-
stance, of easy access to information for them
should be strengthened.
And four, extreme caution must be exercised
in encouraging the resettlement of majority
groups into minority provinces.
In conclusion, it should be stressed that the
model/analysis in this study is able to capture
only a little more than 50 percent of the ob-
served variability in conflict incidence. Not-
withstanding this, however, the root causes
identified are more than enough inputs for gov-
ernment to pursue the necessary policies and
programs that would  properly target and ad-
dress them. Hopefully, they can provide the
necessary impetus in achieving lasting peace
in the country. 
Government policies on peace and income
redistribution are, by far, the most significant
determinant of incidence of conflict. Those that
address relative deprivation especially in terms of
access to and provision of safe water as well as
settlement of land disputes are very important. The
same is true with policies leading to economic growth.